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Abstract:   
A proposed modification to the Federal Crop Insurance Program would allow crop 
producers to simultaneously purchase both a farm-level crop insurance policy and a 
supplemental county-level crop insurance policy. This study evaluates this proposal for 
representative cotton farms in Georgia. The goal is to test whether the additional risk 
protection provided by the supplemental policy is considered to be worth the additional 
cost. 
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Evaluating a Proposed Modification to Federal Crop Insurance 
The U.S. federal crop insurance program offers federally subsidized and reinsured 
yield and revenue insurance policies to crop producers. These policies protect crop 
producers against yield losses caused by natural perils such as drought, excess moisture, 
wind damage, disease, and insect infestation. The revenue insurance products also 
provide some protection against revenue shortfalls caused by low prices. The program, 
which is implemented through the Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, has expanded greatly in recent years. This has occurred 
largely due to new insurance products being offered, insurance products being offered for 
new crops and regions, and increased premium subsidies.  
The traditional federal crop insurance product is Multiple Peril Crop Insurance 
(MPCI), also known as Actual Production History (APH) insurance. This product 
provides protection against farm-level yield losses caused by a variety of natural perils. In 
the early 1990s, the federal crop insurance program began offering a county-level yield 
insurance product known as the Group Risk Plan (GRP) for selected crops and regions. 
This product pays indemnities based not on farm-level yield shortfalls but rather based on 
shortfalls in the county-level yield. Various farm-level revenue insurance products (e.g., 
Crop Revenue Coverage and Revenue Assurance) were added in the mid-1990s and in 
the late 1990s a county-level revenue insurance product known as Group Risk Income 
Protection (GRIP) was made available for selected crops and regions.
1  In 2006, 
approximately 75% of program liability was for farm-level yield and revenue insurance 
                                                 
1 The terms “farm-level” and “county-level” are used here to distinguish these two classes of insurance 
products. However, under certain conditions, farmers can purchase MPCI and some of the farm-level 
revenue insurance products at a sub-farm level. That is, different parts of the farm can be insured as 
separate insurance units.    
1 policies.  Approximately 14% of program liability was for county-level yield and revenue 
insurance policies with the remaining 11% of liability being for a variety of insurance 
products targeted primarily to producers of specialty crops.  
While the farm-level insurance products protect against farm-level yield losses, 
they are subject to problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Knight and 
Coble, 1997). The county-level products are much less subject to adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems but policyholders are exposed to basis risk. In this context, basis 
risk refers to the fact that a farm may experience a yield loss but not receive an indemnity 
from a GRP or GRIP policy because there was no county-level yield shortfall. 
Conversely, it is also possible that a farm may not experience a yield loss but still receive 
a GRP or GRIP indemnity because of a shortfall in the county-level yield. 
Currently, for a given crop produced in a given county, crop insurance purchasers 
must choose only one federal crop insurance product. That is to say, that an insurance 
purchaser must choose either a yield or a revenue insurance product and must choose to 
insure at either the farm-level or the county-level. In the 109
th Congress, Representative 
Randy Neugebauer (TX) introduced legislation (H.R.721) that would authorize the RMA 
to offer GRP coverage as a supplement to an underlying farm-level insurance policy 
(MPCI or one of the revenue insurance products). This study evaluates the implications 
of this proposal for representative cotton farms in Georgia. The goal is to test whether the 
additional risk protection provided by the supplemental GRP policy is considered to be 
worth the additional cost. Specifically, we compare outcomes assuming that the 
representative farms purchase MPCI (at various coverage levels), GRP, or the proposed 
combined insurance product. 
2 Crop Insurance Products 
MPCI insurance is based on the farm’s actual production history (APH) yield.  In 
its most basic form, the APH yield is a 10-year rolling average for the insured unit.   APH 
yields can be initiated with as few as four years of yield records and then build to ten 
years. MPCI indemnities per acre are calculated as  
(1)  election price y y n i i MPCI × − = ) ~ , 0 max( ~  
where  MPCI n ~  is the indemnity per acre,  i y  is a trigger yield equal to the product of the 
APH yield and the selected coverage level, and  i y ~  is the stochastic realized farm-level 
yield. For MPCI, the available coverage levels are from 50% to 85% in 5% increments. 
The maximum price election is established by the RMA. Policyholders can select a price 
election anywhere between 60% and 100% of the maximum. For cotton in Georgia, the 
maximum price election for 2006 was $0.53. 
For GRP the indemnity is calculated as 
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where  GRP n ~  is the GRP indemnity,  c y  is a trigger yield equal to the product of the 
expected county yield and the selected coverage level, and  c y ~  is the stochastic realized 
county yield. For GRP, the available coverage levels are from 70% to 90% in 5% 
increments. Protection per acre is calculated as 
(3)  scale election price yield county expected acre per protection × × =   
where  . The GRP indemnity function has a “disappearing 
deductible” which means that, in an extreme case, if the realized county yield is zero the 
% 150 % 90 ≤ ≤ scale
3 effective coverage is 100%. Procedures for establishing the expected county yield are 
described in Skees, Black and Barnett (1997). 
For the proposed combined insurance product the indemnity per acre would be 
calculated as 
(4)  () () ( ) max
~ 1 ~ ~
GRP MPCI MPCI combined n coverage n n × − + =  
where combined n ~  is the indemnity per acre on the combined product,  MPCI n ~  is as defined in 
(1),   is the coverage level selected for the MPCI portion of the policy, and  MPCI coverage
( max)
~
GRP n  is equal to the GRP indemnity equation in (2) with protection per acre set at the 
maximum level (i.e., scale = 150%).  
Previous Studies 
We are aware of only one other study that has examined the impacts of the 
combined insurance product proposed in H.R. 721. Knight (2006) evaluated the proposed 
combined insurance product for six representative farms: one cotton farm in Texas, one 
cotton farm in Mississippi, one corn farm in Ohio, one corn farm in Kansas, and two 
wheat farms in Kansas. For each farm, three levels of MPCI yield protection were 
considered (50%, 65%, and 75%) in combination with 90% GRP coverage. The findings 
indicated that the combined coverage offered under H.R. 721 would provide additional 
revenue risk protection for all of the farms. The combined insurance product provided the 
greatest benefit (relative to an MPCI policy alone) in counties where yield risk for the 
insured crop was relatively high. In counties with relatively low yield risk, the combined 
insurance product generated only modest additional benefits relative to an MPCI policy 
alone. The added benefits of the combined insurance product declined for higher MPCI 
4 coverage levels. This study extends Knight’s analysis to consider the implications of the 
proposed combined insurance product for representative cotton farms in Georgia. 
Data 
Two types of yield data are used in the analysis. The first is farm-level yield data 
collected from the USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA). These data are APH yield 
histories from Georgia farmers who purchased farm-level cotton insurance (MPCI or 
revenue insurance) in 2001. Thus, the data are for 1991 to 2000. Farms with actual yield 
data for at least the last 6 consecutive years were included in the study.
2  
Historical county-level yield data were obtained from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS). These data are available for cotton production in Georgia from 
1971 to 2005. Due to a positive time trend, the data were detrended using simple linear 
regression 
(5)  i t t CY ε β β + + = 1 0                                              
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where   is the detrended county yield,   is the predicted county yield in year t, 






For the s years when both farm-level and county-level yield data are available (6 






= ε  
                                                 
2 Only actual verified yield data are included in the analysis (e.g., T-yields, etc. have been excluded).  The 
actual yield data have been aggregated to the whole-farm or “enterprise unit” level.  
5 where   is yield for farm i in year s and  is y is ε  is the ratio of the yield on farm i to the 
county yield in year s. 
Following Miller, Barnett, and Coble (2003), pseudo farm yields are calculated by 
combining the detrended county yield data with the estimates of is ε  for the farms in the 
county. Assuming all the values of is ε  are equally likely to happen in any given year, a 
vector of pseudo farm yields for each county is calculated as the direct product of each is ε  
and each value of    
det
t CY




m CY y × = ε
where  . Since farms with at least 6 consecutive years of yield data are used in 
this study and there are 35 years of county yield data, the minimum number of pseudo 
farm yield observations for each representative
M m ..., , 1 =
 farm is  N M × × = 6 35  and the maximum 
is  , where N is the number of farms in the county for which farm-level 
data are available.
N M × × = 10 35
3
Yield Distributions 
County and representative farm yield distributions can be estimated either by 
assuming a parametric distributional family, such as the normal, gamma, or beta or by 
applying nonparametric methods such as kernel smoothing. For this study, the county and 
representative farm yield distributions were estimated using kernel smoothing. For 
representative farms, the kernel density of a given point,  , is defined as   y
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3 This procedure can generate a small number of unreasonably high pseudo farm yields. For this analysis  
pseudo farm yields were censored at 2,000 pounds per acre. 












) (  and K  is the kernel 
density function (Ker and Coble, 2003). Similar procedures were used to estimate the 
kernel density of the county yield distributions. 
Revenue Calculation 
Per acre market revenue is calculated as the product of the realized farm-level 
yield and the loan rate of $0.53 per pound of cotton. Since the insurance products being 
analyzed protect only against yield shortfalls (rather than revenue shortfalls), price is 
treated as a constant rather than as a stochastic variable. 
For MPCI, GRP, and the proposed combined insurance product, the per acre 
premium cost was calculated using RMA FCI-35 premium rate tables available on the 
RMA website. MPCI premium rates are conditioned on the APH yield which, for this 
study, was set equal to the mean yield for each representative farm. The relevant 
premium subsidies were applied to each product to generate subsidized premium costs. 
For each of the insurance products, per acre revenue net of insurance purchasing 
is calculated as 
(10)  k k
market net
k n R R π − + = ~  
where k is an insurance purchasing choice equal to either no insurance, MPCI, GRP, or 
the proposed combined insurance product, 
market R  is market revenue without an insurance 
contract,  k n ~  is the insurance indemnity as calculated in equations (1), (2), or (4), and  k π  
is the premium. For MPCI, coverage levels of 55%, 75% and 85% were considered. The 
price election was set at the maximum value of $0.53 per pound. For GRP, the coverage 
level was set at 90%.  Two scale levels were considered, 100% and 150%. For the 
7 combined insurance product the GRP coverage level was set equal to 90%. Note that if k 
is no insurance,   . 
market net
k R R =
Decision Criterion 
The various insurance contracts are compared based on certainty equivalent 
























where   is from (10) and 
net
k R γ  is the measure of relative risk aversion. For this analysis, γ 
was set equal to 2.  The certainly equivalent of (11) is  
(12a)  ( ) ( )
net
k k k R EU U CE
1 − =  
or for each of the insurance choices 
(12b)    ) ) ( ) ( (
1 pseudo pseudo market
Insurance No dy y f R U U CE ∫ =
−
(12c)     ) ) ( ) ( (
1 pseudo pseudo net
MPCI MPCI dy y f R U U CE ∫ =
−




GRP GRP dy y f R U U CE ∫ =
−


















) ( ) ~ ) cov 1 ((
) ( ) ~ (
) ( ) (






dy y f n erage U
dy y f n U




Numerical methods were used to integrate under the kernel density functions. 
Results 
Table 1 shows certainty equivalent revenues (CERs) under various scenarios. The 
insurance choices shown are MPCI (coverage level at 55%, 75% and 85%), the proposed 
8 combined insurance (coverage level for MPCI portion at 55%, 75% and 85%) and GRP 
(coverage level at 90% with scale at 150% or 100%). 
For each representative farm, the CERs for any of the insurance choices are 
higher than the CER without purchasing insurance. This is not surprising since the 
premiums on the insurance products are subsidized. GRP with scale at 150% is preferred 
to GRP with scale at 100% for each representative farm. However, MPCI at any coverage 
level is preferred to either of the GRP choices. 
For any given MPCI coverage level, the combined insurance policy is preferred to 
the MPCI policy alone for most of the representative farms. The exceptions are the 
Brooks and Dooly County representative farms. Consistent with Knight’s (2006) findings, 
the lower the MPCI coverage, the larger the difference between the CERs for the 
combined insurance policy and those for the MPCI policy alone. When the underlying 
MPCI policy is at 85% coverage, the supplemental GRP policy generates only small 
increases in CERs. When the underlying MPCI policy is at 55% coverage, the 
supplemental GRP policy generates larger increases in CERs. The intuition behind this 
finding is that, the lower the MPCI coverage (higher the MPCI deductible), the greater 
the benefit of having a supplemental GRP policy that provides additional protection 
against yield losses.  
Conclusion 
This study compared MPCI, GRP, and a proposed insurance product that 
combines a supplemental GRP policy with an underlying MPCI policy. The comparison 
was conducted for representative cotton farms in 10 Georgia counties. The purpose of the 
analysis was to test whether the supplemental GRP policy contained in the combined 
9 10 
insurance product is worth the additional cost, relative to just a stand alone MPCI policy. 
The results indicate that for a given MPCI coverage level the combined insurance product 
generates higher certainty equivalent revenues than an MPCI policy for eight of the 10 
representative farms. Also, the difference between the combined product certainty 
equivalent revenues and the MPCI certainty equivalent revenues is larger for lower levels 





                 




















































Colquitt 386.95 418.17 439.81 459.39 421.50 441.66 460.50 394.36 391.89
Irwin  313.57                 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
359.96 383.42 402.79 370.98 389.55 406.46 338.06 329.90
Mitchell 259.01 438.90 467.92 491.30 446.11 471.92 493.70 275.01 269.67
Wilcox 256.78 325.07 348.18 369.07 335.14 353.78 372.43 279.18 271.71
Worth 331.83 405.19 428.06 452.59 411.34 431.48 454.64 345.51 340.95
Early 325.71 438.84 464.92 488.71 456.06 474.49 494.45 363.97 351.22
Turner 252.58 297.19 318.45 337.17 305.41 323.01 339.90 270.83 264.75
Crisp 191.36 282.81 306.41 325.19 286.97 308.72 326.58 200.59 197.51
Dooly 168.32 266.82 294.35 312.67 259.73 290.41 310.30 184.08 174.47
Brooks 289.71 343.94 358.91 378.72 336.70 354.89 376.30 305.81 300.44
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